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Abstract
This paper analyses the Belgian monetary and exchange rate policies at the time of Bretton Woods. It
sheds light on the groping adjustment process by which internal economic policies are hit by or adapt
to the external constraints. In 1944, an ambitious monetary reform laid down the economic policy
objectives  that  remained  in  force  for  two  decades,  namely  price  stability  and  strong  currency.
However, we point out different incompatibilities between these objectives and the economic context
of the 1950s and the 1960s that could have negative consequences on Belgian economic growth. More
precisely, the long lasting European currencies inconvertibility (1944-1958) contradicted the orthodox
approach of the monetary policy favoured by the Central Bank. When total convertibility was finally
achieved, the huge increase of capital movements led to a progressive loss of the monetary policy
autonomy,  despite  the  setting  up  of  a  two-tier  exchange  market,  which  can  be  viewed  as  an
institutional innovation responding to new constraints.
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The Bretton Woods (BW) era is an interesting period of history in more than one respect. In
the first instance, it may be regarded as the “golden age of capitalism” thanks to exceptional
rates of growth. One of the reasons for this growth is almost certainly the dialogue that existed
between nations with a view to setting up a stable international monetary system. The
considerable exchange rate stability during the quarter of a century in question bears witness
to the success of this coordinated approach. However, a detailed examination of the period
shows that the apparent immobility of the system concealed constant shifts in the modus
operandi, procedures based on trial and error and an ongoing process of adapting to change.
Studying this seminal period and understanding how it came about, its heyday and its decline,
yields a wealth of information that can help us to interpret the major upheavals affecting
present-day economies.
The Belgian situation is also very enlightening. For a small and very open economy it is
absolutely vital to manoeuvre a good position against the backdrop of a changing international
scene. In 1944 Belgium had several advantages over other countries: it was located right at
the heart of a Europe under construction; it had a fine industrial heritage and considerable
institutional  expertise;  and  it  was well-versed  in  the  art  of  dialogue,  both  social  and
international. Understanding how the Belgian economy was affected by the transformation of
the international monetary system and how the Belgian authorities dealt with this casts new
light on the way in which economic policy is created and matures within a nation.
We intend to review Belgium’s monetary and exchange policy during the BW era (1944-
1971) against this background. This represents a particular historical interest since these thirty
or so years have often been regarded as a period of extreme stability (fixed exchange rates,
exceptional economic growth, convergence of western economies), but is actually marked by
deep changes. The BW agreements only came into effect very slowly, since European
currencies were initially inconvertible and there was a shortage of dollars. When these
problems resolved themselves in the 1960s, other constraints came to light, sustained by the
development of capital movements. On the national side, the definition and the instruments of
the monetary policy were under deep changes and had to agree with the new objectives of the
economic policy. At the same time, developments in the financial sector led to greater
challenges with respect to monetary policy, which asked for institutional reforms.
We therefore propose to study just how Belgian monetary authorities learned to manage the
ever-changing external constraint, by adapting to the context their instruments and sometimes
the objective of the monetary policy. We are also interested in the consequences of this
management process on the internal sources of money creation, and so on the internal
dynamic of growth.
This article is divided into four sections. The first one is concerned with the key stages
associated with the BW agreements between 1944 and 1971 and describes the process of
setting up, the brief heyday and the ultimately rapid decline of the International Monetary
System (IMS). This breakdown will then serve as a basis for the rest of the article. Section 2
focuses on the immediate post-war Belgian situation and explains the initial choices faced by
economic policy in general terms and by monetary policy in particular. These choices were
strongly influenced by the orthodox approach of the political and monetary leaders of that
time: the key words were a strong franc and the battle against inflation. Section 3 forms the
heart of this article and examines the notion of a strong franc in more detail by comparing the
actions  of  the  Central  Bank  with  the  changing  external  constraints,  marked  by  the3
inconvertibility of European currencies and capital mobility. The management of the external
constraint was not without consequence for the financing of private and public sector, and so
on the internal dynamic of growth. Section 4 of this article examines this aspect in more
detail.
1. Bretton Woods: “stable” framework for national monetary and exchange rates
policies?
The quarter of a century during which the IMS was governed by the BW agreements is
regarded as an exceptional period in the economic history of the western world: particularly
strong economic growth, considerable exchange rate stability, moderate inflation rates, very
low real interest rates, high level of convergence of national performance figures
1. Many
authors are agree that these remarkable results represent the fruits of coherent institutional
collaboration built up after the Second World War: the disastrous experiences of the 1930s
and the war years had convinced the ruling classes and trade union representatives of the need
to work together, both in the international domain and in managing internal labour relations.
At the moment when 44 nations signed the BW agreements, national policy was transformed:
social pacts established a system for regulating relations between labour and capital, welfare
states  took  shape  and  the  first  attempts  at  Keynesian  macroeconomic  policies  were
developed
2.
Establishment of a stable exchange rate system is thus part of a wider raft of measures that
demonstrate the commitment of nations and people to try a new form of governance of
international and labour relations. And yet, history shows that there was a definite hiatus,
which was only overcome gradually, and even then only partially, between the declarations of
intent in the immediate post-war period and implementation of such a system of governance
in practice. In this first section we shall review, in turn, the principles of the IMS established
in 1944, the problems faced when implementing this system in practice in the early stages
(1944-1958) and the reasons why it had such a brief heyday, ultimately leading to its collapse
(1959-1971).
1.1. The characteristics of the Bretton Woods international monetary system
In the mid 1940s, a return to the days of the gold standard seemed inconceivable. On the
contrary, it was widely accepted that the abortive attempt to re-establish the gold standard
during the 1930s had contributed to the Great Depression. This gave rise to the belief that
each nation should be free to decide its own macroeconomic policy. In this situation,
exchange rates had to display sufficient flexibility to be able to adapt to the inflation and
employment targets selected by national governments rather than automatically complying
with an international standard. However, to prevent a return to the “beggar thy neighbour”
policies of the 1930s and to allow normal international trade to be restored, exchange rates
had to be relatively stable. The BW negotiations were therefore dominated by the need to find
a controlled mean of exchange rate flexibility with a view to ensuring exchange stability
while avoiding the rigidity of the gold standard
3.
The principles of the BW system, as established in 1944, are well known. Each country
defined the value of its currency in gold or in dollars, which could be converted to gold at the
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rate of 35 dollars per ounce. Exchange rates were stable, but adjustable: in the short term, the
effective exchange rate of each currency could not deviate from parity with the dollar by more
than plus or minus one percent
4; however, in the event of a “fundamental disequilibrium”, any
nation could unilaterally adjust its parity by devaluing or revaluing its currency. Free currency
convertibility applied to current account payments, but capital movements were restricted.
The possibility of adjusting exchange rates and restrictions on capital movements were
intended to ensure the autonomy of national macroeconomic policies.
Despite the clear-cut nature of these principles, it was difficult to put them into practice. This
only happened in stages, requiring the introduction of additional institutions, and in actual fact
led to an IMS that functioned much more asymmetrically than had been envisaged by its
founders. There are three historical phases that are worthy of note: the slow progression
towards convertibility, which continued until 1958; the “cruising” period, which lasted for
barely a decade, and the decline of the system, which began in 1968. In the outline below, we
shall combine the last two phases to enable us to stress the contrast between the pre-
convertibility regime and the full currency convertibility period.
1.2. The uphill struggle to restore currency convertibility (1944-1958)
Two major problems posed an obstacle to the rapid implementation of all the BW principles:
first, due to the aftermath of WWII, international trade was limited. By consequence, it was
impossible for European central banks to restore exchange reserves. Second, due to this lack
of exchange reserves, European currencies were effectively inconvertible. For most of the
signatory states, with the notable exception of the United States, the legacy of the war was a
very restrictive set of exchange controls and trade constraints. The BW agreements made it
possible to maintain exchange controls on current account transactions on a provisional basis.
This thus signified recognition of the fact that currency convertibility could not happen
overnight. As a pragmatic way to ensure resumption of foreign trade, the nations signed
bilateral agreements with their main partners at the end of the war. On this basis, the net
importer could acknowledge a debt to his partner instead of transferring exchange reserves.
However, this was only a very temporary and very localised solution: on the one hand, if the
imbalance was not transient and tended to recur, it was of no advantage to the net exporter to
accumulate credits in this period of reconstruction when demand for goods and services was
so high; on the other hand, this same country could not make use of its position as a creditor
to finance imports from a third-party country, since the agreement was only bilateral. These
agreements were therefore subject to licences and quotas.
A multilateral system of payments between European countries was gradually introduced with
effect from 1947. Although this did have the effect of making it easier to control foreign
trade, the multilateral agreements did not resolve the problem of the global trade imbalance
between the block of countries that had signed the agreement and the rest of the world, and in
particular between Europe and the United States. The contrast between these two world zones
was huge: the first was faced with complete reconstruction and needed to import; the second
had emerged from the war with a very strong production apparatus and was very willing to
export. Nevertheless, gold reserves were concentrated in the United States and Europe had no
dollars. The Marshall Plan and the European Payments Union represented a way out of this
impasse.
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The European Cooperation Agreement of 1948, which launched the Marshall Plan, was
intended to help the countries of Western Europe (united within the Organisation for
European Economic Cooperation, OEEC) to speed up their return to a market economy and to
ensure economic stability, itself a guarantee of political stability. This plan played a crucial
role  in  promoting  the  restoration  of  currency  convertibility  in  Europe.  It  specifically
encouraged the beneficiary nations to extend bilateral loans to other members of the OEEC. It
provided Europe with much-needed exchange reserves in the form of dollars. The adjustments
that it advocated between the currencies of the old continent very soon became official thanks
to the creation of the European Payments Union (EPU, 1950-1958), which led the way
towards full convertibility.
With the EPU, transferability of debts was extended to cover all the nations in the OEEC. In
addition, balances, debts or claims were not drawn up with respect to a particular country but
to the Union as a whole. Settlement of balances was governed by a system of quotas: up to a
pre-agreed threshold, balances did not need to be settled in gold or in dollars. The countries
simply recorded a debt or a claim against the EPU. By using mechanisms of this kind, the
EPU provided a temporary answer to the shortage of gold and dollars.
However, the huge amount of aid provided to Europe by the United States and the ways in
which this was administered propelled the IMS in a direction that caused it, little by little, to
move away from its initial principles. The imbalance between the dollar and the other
currencies was upheld by and large; the dollar becoming the international accounting unit in
practice. Finally, the European nations came under pressure to fix the parity of their
currencies with respect to the dollar – instead of it being “stable but adjustable”. These
implicit rules of the game, which no longer corresponded to the initial intentions, led to
reduced autonomy for national economic policies, while the United States emerged as the
only  nation  to  have  any  genuine  monetary  independence.  Full  convertibility  and
transferability for current movements of European currencies came about in 1958, which
meant that the EPU had achieved its objective and could be wound up, but the IMS had taken
a hitherto unexpected turn.
1.3. From convertibility to the decline of the system (1959-1971)
After 1959, the BW system moved into its “cruising” period. Each country played a part in
the exchange market by selling or buying dollars with a view to maintaining parity within the
narrow margin of 1% either side of the dollar. The United States guaranteed a fixed rate of 35
dollars for one ounce of gold by selling or buying gold. The dollar gradually confirmed its
status as the only international currency, finally usurping Sterling in the 1960s. It seemed
appropriate to use dollars as an exchange currency in preference to gold, in which there was a
marked lack of interest and which was not available in sufficient reserves to satisfy the
vigorous growth of the 1950s and 1960s. This was accompanied by a lively development in
capital movements as controls were gradually eased. The majority of countries gradually gave
up the ability to adjust their parities in line with their internal macroeconomic conditions to
avoid giving the financial markets signals that might encourage speculation. The “stable but
adjustable” exchange rate system changed, little by little, into a fixed exchange rate system,
then into a dollar standard. While the general macroeconomic context changed gradually –
growth  in  international  trade,  relative  improvement  in  European  and  Japanese
competitiveness, development of financial markets – the tension between the principle of the6
autonomy of national economic policies and the principle of fixed exchange rates became
more pronounced, to the detriment of the former
5.
Thus, even in its heyday, the weaknesses in the Bretton Woods system were starting to
become apparent. In 1960, the gold reserves of the United States were insufficient to cover all
external dollar commitments; with effect from 1964, they no longer covered the dollars held
by foreign central banks
6. While the initial scarcity of dollars gave way to abundance, or even
overabundance, a dollar market was developing in Europe – the Eurodollar market - paving
the way for many financial transactions that were still banned or restricted in the European
currencies. The integration of national financial markets gained in momentum; speculation
pressure increased and restrictions gradually crumbled away.
After 1968, the system encountered a period of more substantial unrest that it was unable to
survive. Finally, when it became apparent that the dollar was overvalued with respect to
European and Japanese currencies, the latent problems of confidence and liquidity rose to the
fore and speculation raged. Pressure on the gold reserves of the United States was so intense
that the Nixon administration decided to close the gold window on 15 August 1971. The
following eighteen months were particularly fraught and showed that it would be impossible
to return to a stable exchange rate system. The central banks withdrew from the exchange
market on 1 March 1973 and left the dollar to float, thus sounding the death knell of the BW
system
7.
This brief overview of the principles and development of the IMS that reigned from 1944 to
1971 was necessary in order to provide a framework for the implementation of a national
monetary  policy.  This  first  section  stresses  the  extremely  changeable  nature  of  this
framework, even though this is regarded as a historical model of stability. Ever-changing
external constraints: such were the challenges faced by the Belgian monetary authorities.
Before analysing this point in any greater detail (Section 3), section 2 dwells on the economic
and institutional situation in Belgium in the immediate post-war period.
2. Main guidelines of the Belgian monetary policy just after World War II
As in many European countries, the occupation years threw the economy into disarray and led
to galloping inflation. However, as Belgium surrendered in May 1940, there was limited
destruction and the industrial infrastructure was still intact. In addition, the fact that Belgium
specialised in the production of staple commodities (coal, semi-finished metal, cement) was a
considerable advantage at a time when all Europe needed to rebuild itself. Nevertheless, it
was essential for the economy to take off again within a stable institutional framework.
Discussions on how to use institutions to stimulate growth, which had started back in the
1930s, had continued throughout the war: economic leaders and social partners had conducted
negotiations, either secretely or during their exile, with a view to restructuring the economy
after liberation. When this came about, in September 1944, a draft social solidarity agreement
had already been drawn up and was approved by the major socio-political forces within the
country. It covered salaries, social security and joint participation, but also dealt implicitly
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with bringing inflation under control and selecting a strong exchange rate. This draft
agreement, better known as the “social pact”, made it possible to implement both monetary
and social reform with immediate effect. These aspects are probably the two most important
factors that ensured a particularly rapid reconstruction process, which in Belgium’s case
became known as the “Belgian miracle”
8.
From the monetary viewpoint, there were two opposing schools of thought on the subject of
how to restore balance to the inflated money supply resulting from the war years, while at the
same time fitting into the framework imposed by the Bretton Woods agreements. In the face
of the more “Keynesian” vision of the former Prime Minister, Paul van Zeeland, the
“orthodox” vision of Finance Minister Camille Gutt and National Bank’s Governor Maurice
Frère prevailed. In the eyes of the Bank’s management
9, the best mean of responding
effectively to the challenges posed by the reconstruction and the Bretton Woods agreements
was to ensure monetary stability: “The Bank can make a real contribution to the problem of
re-equipping the nation by ensuring monetary stability to uphold State credit and maintain
confidence in national currency savings
10.”
Monetary stability has first an internal aspect. They were keen to maintain the purchasing
power of the franc at as high level as possible, which required a moderate inflation rate.
Controlling inflation would ensure saver confidence by limiting the risk of savings losing
their  purchasing  power.  According  to  the  Bank,  this  objective  could  be  achieved  by
controlling the money supply
11. This did not mean maintaining the amount of money in
circulation at a stable level, but at a growing level ensuring the economy’s recovery of the
country. In addition, indirect control of total expenditure within the economy by limiting the
available funds to finance this expenditure should enable direct controls to be abolished as
soon as possible and to restore the mechanisms of a market economy, another of the declared
objectives of the authorities at that time. Avoiding any loss of monetary control became the
Bank’s byword for internal action.
Secondly, monetary stability also equated to exchange rate stability. The new framework
established at the BW Conference did not actually rule out the risk of devaluation. However,
the Bank wanted to prevent the need to resort to such measures. They opted for an identical
solution to achieve this “external stability”: only by controlling expansion of means of
payment, and thus inflation, would it be possible to emit the necessary signals to generate
confidence in the Belgian franc amongst foreign purchasers. In turn, this confidence would
stimulate exports, which were particularly important for Belgian growth (Table 3.b.). The
initial option was therefore to impose the discipline of a strict monetary policy. It seems that
the Bank did not want to make use of all the flexibility granted under the BW agreements, but
tended instead to the “orthodox” approach imposed by a gold standard system.
To make these objectives possible, a strong monetary reform was first essential. The so-called
“Gutt plan” (organised by Finance Minister) was extremely significant for Belgian economic
policy as a whole during the post-war years. There is no need to go into any further detail at
this point as to the way this reform was implemented with effect from 7 October 1944.
Nevertheless, we shall briefly summarise its objectives, as these reveal the choices faced by
Belgium in terms of monetary policy:
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10 Banque nationale de Belgique, Rapport annuel, 1948, p. 12 (own translation).
11 idem, p. 11.8
- The main aim was to reduce the amount of money in circulation with a view to ruling out
any latent inflation. In this way, the initiators of the reform hoped to control prices while
eradicating the black market.
- The fight against latent inflation also contributed to the external objective: the stabilisation
operation had to make it possible to maintain the exchange rate at the parity figure
established on 5 October 1944 in the aftermath of the Bretton Woods Conference. This aim
was all the harder to achieve as the chosen parity corresponded to a relative overvaluation
of the Belgian franc as a result of the five wartime years
12: the National Bank made the
point that the exchange rate with the pound “can only be maintained at 176.625 francs to
one pound Sterling if the growth in national purchasing power does not exceed the amount
resulting from parity of purchasing power with the major international currencies at this
new exchange rate
13.” In other words, this value could only be maintained by drastic
controls on the money supply. The money in circulation therefore had to be reduced “to the
level of the major allied nations, particularly the British system, which is of crucial
importance for Belgium’s economic relations
14.”
-  Finally, the reform included a fiscal objective by levying tax, sometimes at a rate of 100%,
on any increased wealth that had come about as a result of the war.
For the monetary authorities, the reduction in the money supply brought about by the Gutt
plan was just one of the stages that enabled them to rebuild monetary policy on a new sound
footing. Indeed, monetary stabilisation would be compromised if commercial banks used their
public debt securities for refinancing to grant corresponding loans to the private sector. The
amount of public debt held by banks was considerable and represented more than three-
quarters of their total debts in 1945, compared with one-third five years previously
15. It would
be easy for them to obtain funds by selling some of these certificates. Outstanding loans were
therefore to be extended.
Despite all these measures and the willingness of the monetary authorities, the first problems
soon came to light, i.e. before the end of the war. In fact, the continued hostilities in Belgium
over the winter of 1944-45 meant that the war effort remained in place. The government had
to contend with its own expenditure, which was already considerable, and bear the costs of the
allied armies in accordance with mutual agreements
16. Tax levies could not be increased,
however. The government thus decided to finance its deficits by monetary means with the
Bank’s assistance.
This situation had only been partially anticipated by the Bank, thus wiping out some of the
effects of the Gutt reform
17. However, this could not be regarded as a failure
18. There is no
doubt that the measures taken restored confidence in the franc both in Belgium and abroad,
thus ruling out any speculation with regard to inflation or devaluation
19. There would certainly
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19 Governor Frère spoke of a “psychological shock”; see Banque nationale de Belgique, Rapport annuel, 1946,
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have been a much greater growth in the money supply without any reform. We should also
remember that the objective of the monetary policy was not to maintain the amount of money
in circulation at 1944 levels. It was even considered desirable to have a level of growth
compatible with moderate inflation and achieve exchange rate stability. The rapid recovery of
the Belgian economy could thus justify in the eyes of the Bank a certain proportion of the
increase in means of payment.
Convinced that the initial problems were only temporary, the Bank was not alarmed by the
monetary situation. It thus sought to support the nation’s economic recovery within the
constraints of healthy monetary growth. History proves it to have been correct in the first
instance, as military expenditure was short-lived. Moreover, from the end of 1945, the allied
governments started to pay back the funds advanced previously, thus providing an important
source of currency for the Bank
20 and a new means of government financing. The Bank was
delighted with this turn of events and drew the conclusion that “Belgium is facing the second
year of reconstruction with a stable currency and considerable reserves of gold and foreign
currency
21.”
To conclude, the strength of the Belgian economy was partly due to the fact that its general
economic situation was less serious than that of the other European nations affected by the
war, and partly due to the extremely short time taken by the authorities to set up new
institutions. This enabled Belgium to make a smooth transition from a wartime economy to a
peacetime economy. In the following years, however, the choices posed in terms of monetary
policy were challenged by the evolution of the BW agreements described in Section 1.
3. The monetary policy practice facing changing external constraints (1946-1971)
During the period between 1944 and 1971, the Belgian franc demonstrated considerable
stability with respect to the dollar, with the exception of the problems in 1971, which caused
the Bretton Woods system to implode and had an impact on all currencies. Indeed, while
exchange rate realignments were admissible in the event of a balance of payments imbalance,
the Belgian franc was only devalued once, in 1949, and by a minimal amount compared with
the realignments decided for other currencies. Furthermore, exchange fluctuations on the
official dollar market remained for the most part below the fluctuations permitted under the
BW agreements (graph 1).
These simple facts may lead one to believe that it was a very easy task to implement monetary
and exchange policy under this international system. This most certainly was not the case.
Detailed analysis of this period reveals all the complexity of maintaining a stable currency.
The aim of this section is to show how the Belgian monetary authorities managed the external
constraints dominated first by the inconvertibility of European currencies until 1958 and then
by the development of capital movements.
3.1. Monetary policy and currency inconvertibility
During the period in which European currencies were inconvertible (1944-1958), it quickly
became difficult for the Bank to achieve its aim of monetary stability in Belgium: the system
of multilateral agreements that came into force from 1947 was certainly significant, as it made
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it possible to kick-start intra-European trade, but was based on the implicit assumption of a
balance between current account movements between the various countries over the course of
time. The current account surpluses that a country could register with respect to its partners
had to be followed by deficits, with the result that the mutual loans granted by central banks
cancelled  each  other  out.  However,  Belgium’s  considerable  current  account  surpluses
compared to its European partners meant that Belgium was a net creditor with respect to these
other nations. This imbalance was also reinforced by the voluntary waiting periods, known as
leads and lags, between the time of a commercial transaction and the actual conversion of
currency, coming from the growing confidence in the Belgian franc thanks to the initial
choice of monetary policy and the country’s rapid economic recovery.
This situation would not have posed a major problem if, in exchange, Belgium had been able
to use these credits to pay for products from the Unites States, as, like all the European
economies, Belgium was a net debtor with respect to the United States. However, there was
no provision for such a solution. In accordance with multilateral agreements, only a small
proportion of the sums due was payable in gold or in convertible currencies (dollars) and
could be used for such purposes. As a result, imports from the United States had to be paid for
by digging deep into the Bank’s gold and convertible currencies reserves, which was against
Bank’s aim.
The imbalance in Belgian foreign trade between European countries and the United States
could compromise the monetary stability. In its 1947 report, the Bank toned down the
enthusiasm of the first two years of the post-war period:
“Although there is no doubt that the growth in the Bank’s currency assets as part of the
payment agreements concluded in the aftermath of liberation is largely responsible for
the growth in our export business, we should not pretend that the development of this
trend will affect the amount of money in circulation, and, as a result, the price system;
and finally, the country’s ability to compete
22.”
Indeed, all things being equal, an increase in the number of loans granted by the Bank and
entered on the assets side of the balance sheet, would be offset by the increase in paper money
entered on the liabilities side. The Bank therefore only had limited influence on the creation
of money as a result of international trade, which could ultimately lead to a risk of inflation
getting out of control. To avoid this risk, the Bank had to take measures aimed at restricting
exports to European countries and ensuring greater control of other sources of money
creation. These points will be examined in detail in Section 4. This reveal the problems
involved in managing external constraints during the period of currency inconvertibility.
Thanks to the restrictive measures taken by the Bank, these post-war problems had a reduced
effect on the external stability of the Belgian franc (strong franc objective). On the contrary,
the general realignment of European currency exchange rates with respect to the dollar in
1949 provided the Belgian monetary authorities with the opportunity to confirm their
objective of maintaining a strong currency. From the Bank’s point of view, it was not
necessary to modify the exchange rate between the Belgian franc and the dollar or gold,
whereas the majority of currencies were devalued by some 30%. The government eventually
decided to devalue the Belgian franc, but only by 12.3%, which represented a revaluation of
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more than 26% compared with the currencies of its principal partners. The choice of a relative
revaluation seems to have been based on three considerations:
-  the Belgian economy’s much stronger and faster recovery than the European average in
the immediate post-war period, sometimes referred to as the “Belgian miracle”;
-  the desire on the part of the Belgian monetary authorities to confirm their unconditional
commitment to the gold standard, the best of all standards in the Bank’s opinion;
-  the implicit aim of these same authorities to relieve the Belgian current account surplus by
restructuring foreign trade (American products became more expensive for Belgian
importers and Belgian products became more expensive for European importers).
During the period between 1950 and 1958, the development of European trade was supported
not only by the Marshall Plan, but also by the addition of a capital institution to back up the
BW agreements: the European Payments Union (see Section 1). However, the EPU did not
bring about full convertibility of European currencies. Despite partial settlement of deficits in
dollars or in gold, it only served to prolong the credit system between signatory nations, as
had been set up in the days of the first payment agreements. It still worked to the disadvantage
of creditor countries, as noted by R. Triffin, and thus only represented a limited solution to the
specific problems faced by Belgium
23. By developing international trade, the agreement
actually increased the risk of monetary expansion linked to the loans granted by the Belgian
authorities. In fact, driven by the tensions of the Korean war in the early 1950s, the amount of
the loans granted by Belgium
24 to all countries in the EPU rose rapidly, as shown in Table 1,
and the quota fixed when the agreements were signed was reached as early as 1952, forcing
the Bank to step up the restrictive measures it had taken at the end of the 1940s. Although the
EPU was a step towards convertibility of European currencies, the Bank made the point that:
“Operation of the system brings us up against major problems due to the changing
nature of the accounts of some of its members; this is particularly relevant in the case of
the excessive deficits that a number of countries within the Union have accumulated
with respect to the BLEU. The latter is thus faced with a difficult decision. If it agrees to
provide additional aid to the European Payments Union, it risks compromising the
fruits of the orthodox monetary policy that it has imposed up until now and that has
ensured the strength of the Belgian franc. If the measures that it adopts lead, in one way
or another, to a tightening of export flows, it will be committing itself to a dangerous
course in terms of maintaining its level of economic activity and the standard of living
of its people
25.”
Despite the EPU, the major constraint faced by Belgian monetary authorities was still the
insufficient proportion of current deficits that were actually paid in gold and thus the volume
of loans that had to be granted
26. Belgium suffered from a lack of dollars and at the same time
was forced into a position where it was building up claims on the other EPU zone countries.
Table 1 shows the situation of Belgium in the EPU. In the first few years of operation of the
EPU, less than 60% of the surplus was reimbursed in gold or in convertible currencies. The
rest corresponds to loans granted to EPU members. Initially, the Government undertook to
finance these loans. However, due to its chronic deficits, it was not in a position to play a
significant role in covering these loans. The Bank was thus obliged to step in very soon in
                                                   
23 Triffin (1957). See also Eichengreen (1993) and Janssens (1976) for specific measures concerning Belgium.
24 In fact, Belgium and Luxemburg were merged for all monetary agreements, to form the Belgo-Luxemburg
Economic Union (BLEU). However, we will here use the term «!Belgium!».
25 Banque nationale de Belgique (1952), p. 85 (own translation).
26 For a more detailed explanation, see Banque nationale de Belgique, Rapport annuel, 1952, pp. 90-91.12
order to finance the loans on behalf of the State, with the associated risk of increasing the
money supply.
For this reason, a number of countries, including Belgium, advocated a rapid return to
convertibility with effect from 1955. Following the upheaval in the early years of the EPU,
payments between European countries were effected increasingly smoothly. However, other
countries wanted to see the agreement extended by a temporary system to avoid running into
problems with the exchange markets. The risk of speculation on European currencies was
likely to re-emerge and many central banks did not have the necessary resources to cope with
it. An interim solution was therefore adopted in 1955: the EPU was renewed, but a greater
proportion of the deficits was reimbursed in gold from then on. This is why Table 1 shows
that the proportion of the surplus that was reimbursed in gold or in dollars increased sharply
in the second half of the period in question. The increase in the inflows of gold and dollars
made it possible to limit the pressure on the money supply (these currencies could be used to
pay for imports from the dollar zone), but also to achieve an objective that was close to the
Bank’s heart: in 1957, it managed to get a monetary law passed, redefining the Belgian franc
as a quantity of gold and restoring the obligation to have 30% cover in gold. This was in
actual fact a barely concealed return to the gold standard, contrasting sharply with the
situation in other European economies (Figure 3).
To conclude, the entire currency inconvertibility period was characterised by tension between
external constraints and implementation of an orthodox monetary policy. This tension resulted
from a combination of:
-  the slow introduction of the BW agreements;
-  the Belgian economy’s unique position in Europe;
-  the Bank’s restrictive view of the BW agreements.
European currency convertibility for current transactions was finally ensured after 1959. The
problems mentioned above thus resolved themselves, even though the continued existence of
a current account surplus with respect to the rest of the world maintained a certain amount of
pressure on the money supply. Although one of the Bank’s major problems disappeared with
the advent of European currency convertibility, other problems, linked to capital movements,
started to assume increased importance at the same time.
3.2. Exchange policy, strong franc and capital movements
From the 1950s, capital movements started to increase for two main reasons:
-  The existence of free markets in foreign financial centres permitted, to some extent,
capital transactions outside the influence of the central banks. Capital movements were
thus alive and kicking despite all the controls and obstacles. They were also often
concealed by current movements.
-  The Bank wanted to remove any obstacles to natural operation of the exchange market.
With this in mind, it was determined to lift restrictions on capital movements. Its aim was
also to allow these movements to soften the effects of Belgium’s trade surpluses with
other European countries: if current account surpluses were offset by capital outflows, the
central bank would be less likely to need to intervene in the exchange markets. For this
reason also, the Bank aimed to conduct a very strict monetary policy. It hoped to maintain
confidence in the franc to be able to lift restrictions on capital movements without any
risk of major speculation, which might disrupt the exchange market.13
Let us not forget that capital movements entail risks for the central banks: if any speculation
arises or if such speculation forces events in an undesirable direction, it can amplify trade
imbalances and make it imperative for the central bank to intervene more heavy-handedly in
the exchange markets. This is one of the main reason why restrictions on capital movements
were imposed by the BW agreements. But the gradual lifting of restrictions on capital
movements thus further curtails the autonomy of the central bank’s monetary policy. In the
extreme case of perfect capital mobility, this would inevitably boil down to following the
prevailing interest rates abroad, thus losing a key instrument of monetary policy
27.
To prevent this disadvantage while at the same time lifting restrictions on capital movements,
the Belgo-Luxembourg Exchange Institute set up a two-tier exchange market from 1954
onwards. The Bank intervened in the official market to defend the parity of the Belgian franc
in  relation  to  other  currencies.  However,  this  market  only  affected  current  account
transactions.  Capital  transactions  were  consigned  to  the  free  market  where  the  Bank
theoretically did not intervene. The Belgian franc exchange rate was thus allowed to float in
this market
28. Figure 2 shows, moreover, that free exchange rates for the principal currencies
concerned deviated from the fluctuations authorised under the aegis of BW on several
occasions.
Thanks to the two-tier exchange market, defending the franc’s exchange rate became less of
an issue for the Belgian monetary authorities. If capital movements substantially changed the
Belgian  franc’s  exchange  rate  in  the  free  market,  the  floating  exchange  rate’s  own
mechanisms automatically restored market balance. Belgian monetary authorities had maybe
found the ideal solution to open up their economy: a clever mixture of fixed and floating
exchange rates with the further possibility of allowing certain transactions to shift between
markets.
However, the free market exchange rate expresses the value attributed to the Belgian franc by
the market without any intervention on the part of the Bank. If there was a recurrent
difference between the exchange rates on the two markets, this would indicate a structural
over- or undervaluation of the exchange rate for the Belgian franc, which would give the
signal for speculation to commence. As the barrier between the two markets is not entirely
watertight, a development along these lines would sooner or later lead to intervention by the
Bank. The latter – or to be more precise, the Belgo-Luxembourg Exchange Institute under the
auspices of the Bank – is thus not precluded from all forms of intervention in the wake of
capital movements, but may limit its intervention to long-term issues. In other words, the two-
tier exchange market is only a short-term solution to the problems of the incompatibility
triangle: the Bank is, however, required to maintain a strict monetary policy in order to
prevent capital movements from causing the exchange rate in the free market to deviate
significantly and permanently from official parity.
As a result, and in accordance with theory, the Bank gradually lost the ability to use interest
rates as an instrument for internal purposes. External constraints thus had a definite influence
on monetary policy in Belgium (this was no longer a deliberate choice): an interest rate
change (in the light of inflation and the exchange rate) was rapidly reflected by major capital
movements and a significant modification of the exchange rate in the free market. To prevent
                                                   
27 This problem is known as the Mundell’s triangle of incompatibility. See for example Mundell (1963) or
Aglietta (1994).
28 The IMF allowed Belgium to introduce this mechanism only because it was a small economy. Such an
exchange market could not destabilize the hole Bretton Woods system.14
this from becoming an ongoing situation, the Bank was then forced to align its interest rates
with those applicable in the rest of the world, and occasionally had to intervene in the free
market
29. The development of the capital movements, encouraged by the speculation on Gold
and the Dollar, accelerated the loss of autonomy, particularly during the second half of the
1960s.
In addition, the Belgian franc did not follow the example of the Mark and the Guilder in
revaluing in 1961, or the further revaluation of the Mark in 1969. Should we regard this as a
loss of confidence in the Belgian currency? There are several reasons that would tend to
justify this view. First and foremost we can put forward the hypothesis that the development
of capital movements and the parallel existence of a free market reduce the Bank’s ability to
maintain a particularly strong franc at all costs. Indeed, as explained above, the free market
expresses the “fair value” of the Belgian franc. This was depreciated on several occasions
during the 1960s, especially at the start of this decade and in 1969 (see Figure 2). In that
particular year the Belgian franc had been linked to the French franc by the operators of the
exchange markets and this had just been devalued. Against this background, it is difficult to
understand how the Bank could have pushed through a revaluation with respect to the dollar
and maintained parity with the Mark. There was no longer any question of the Bank
remaining in the elite group of leading European currencies at any cost, as it could no longer
afford to do so
30. The early 1960s therefore marked a major change in the Bank’s objectives:
in theory, they were still primarily concerned with monetary stability, but in practice there
was a good deal more flexibility. This shift in objectives was the result not only of internal
debate (see Section 4), but also of the tightening of the external constraints.
The development of capital movements thus led to a major change in the way in which
Belgian monetary policy was implemented by confirming the interrelationships between
economies, thus restricting monetary policy autonomy, but also by revealing the value
attributed to the Belgian franc by the markets via the free currency market. This shows that
the return to European currency convertibility did not eliminate all the tension between the
IMS and implementation of monetary policy. After 1958, this was principally due first to the
changing interpretation of the Bretton Woods agreements: neither the development of capital
movements nor the risks associated with inconvertibility of the dollar into gold had been
anticipated in the initial version of the agreements. Second, the Bank’s willingness to promote
capital mobility facilitated speculation.
By conclusion, It seems that the learning curve involved in managing external constraints was
rendered  more  difficult  by  a  changing  international  monetary  context:  during  the
inconvertibility period, when the Bank had a certain degree of autonomy with regard to
monetary policy, it chose to apply very restrictive policies in the name of monetary stability
and the increasing openness of the economy. Following the return to convertibility, it was
forced to gradually give up its autonomy.
It goes without saying that interaction between monetary policy and external constraints was
not without effect on internal money supply management, as described above. Section 4
examines these effects in some details.
                                                   
29 Some historical works show that the Bank intervened several times on the free market after 1955. For more
detail, see Brion and Moreau (2005), p. 314.
30 In fact, many reasons explain why Belgium could not remain in the «!leading!» group of European currencies.
The explosion of the public debt during the Fifties is one of them. For more details on this point, see Cassiers
and Ledent (2005), chapter 4.15
4. Managing internal sources of money creation (1946-1971)
Section 3 showed quite clearly that managing external constraints took a great deal of effort
on the part of the Belgian monetary authorities throughout the period in question. While
European currencies remained inconvertible and Belgium was still a net creditor in its
external trade relations with Europe, the recurrent pressure on the money supply imposed by
granting loans to foreign countries increased the risk of inflation in Belgium. From the Bank’s
point of view, it was thus essential to curb other sources of money creation, so that these did
not increase the external pressures, but rather offset these pressures to the greatest possible
extent. However, the public sector budget had experienced considerable deficits since the end
of the war, due to the reconstruction and new functions of the State. These deficits were
initially financed by the Bank (hence money creation), which was not in keeping with its
objectives. On the other hand, the reconstruction of the production apparatus required
substantial loans. The introduction of “bank ratios” in 1946 did, however, provide a radical
solution to this dual problem.
4.1. The cost of monetary stability
In theory, the imposition of “structural ratios” may be regarded as a standard monetary policy
decision. Such ratios oblige commercial banks to cover a proportion of their deposits by
reserves (cash or specified securities), either to ensure that their overall balance can be
managed prudently, or to limit their capacity for creating bank money. Nevertheless, the
measures taken by Belgium in 1946 represent a reform with wider implications.
Indeed, the Banking Commission’s ruling of 29 January 1946, introduced at the Bank’s
instigation, represented the first use of structural ratios in Belgium and this was made possible
by the banking reform of 1935
31. Yet whereas this essentially aimed to safeguard the solvency
and liquidity of banks with a view to protecting savings, the 1946 ruling also used ratios to
deal with the prevailing problem of the time: financing public debt.
Apart from cash and solvency ratios aimed at ensuring prudent bank management
32, a “cover
ratio” required the banks to keep 50 to 65% of their total deposits in the form of public sector
debt securities. This very high percentage corresponded to the situation as it existed at the end
of the war and thus did not seem overly restrictive at first glance. The initial objective was to
prolong the effects of the Gutt reform by freezing the bank assets structure: the aim was to
prevent the banks from reselling the public sector debt securities in their possession on the
market in order to obtain funds and thus grant loans to the private sector, as these would
increase the amount of money in circulation. The constraints imposed by the cover ratio
became tighter as deposits increased and really started to make their presence felt after 1949
33.
The aim of this measure was then to provide the State with a source of stable finance by
channelling a constant proportion of the money created by the banks in the direction of the
public sector.
                                                   
31 See Cassiers (1997), Timmermans (1969) for further information.
32 The cash ratio is calculated as the ratio between the bank’s funds and its current short-term liabilities. The
solvency ratio is defined as the ratio between the bank’s own funds and the funds of third parties. See Cassiers
(1997), p. 615, for more details.
33 See Cassiers (1997), Graph 12, p. 667.16
This legislation made it possible not only to transfer the onus for financing public deficits on
to the commercial banks, but also to reduce their capacity for financing the private sector. In
short, it represented a precarious kind of balance in the Belgian financial sector, which
managed to keep almost all the participants happy:
-  The Bank resolved the problem of providing monetary finance for the State and could also
ensure a slight growth in the money supply (bank money in particular), since the
mechanism established generated a very low monetary multiplier. Given the pressure
exerted by the external money creation source, the Bank had no reason to impose any
hasty changes on a system that was supposed to be temporary from the outset.
-  The State obtained a simple and inexpensive source of finance. Indeed, the treasury bond
market was not subject to the laws of supply and demand.
-  Despite their reticence, the commercial banks were happy with this system, as it provided
them with an important and particularly secure debtor base.
This  is  why  the  bank  ratios  system,  although  initially  only  temporary,  would  remain
essentially unchanged until 1957 before being abolished in 1962.
When external pressure on the money supply became too great, notably in 1948 and 1951, the
Bank also took measures to alleviate the situation with a view to restricting Belgian exports to
European countries and the credit to the private sector. The Bank felt that these measures
were necessary in order to ensure monetary stability and regarded the latter as the sole
contribution it could make to economic growth. However, the combination of these measures
and ruling seems unlikely to have stimulated Belgian growth during the 1950s (Table 3.a.):
-  the 1946 legislation prevented the commercial banks from acting as financial backers to
the private sector;
-  the limited devaluation of the Belgian franc with respect to the dollar in 1949 made
Belgian companies less competitive compared with their European competitors, which
could account for the low level of investment during the 1950s;
-  parallel measures to restrict exports had a negative effect on Belgian growth, as the Bank
itself admitted.
So while Belgian’s economic balance was particularly positive in terms of inflation (Figure 5)
and exchange rates during the 1950s, the same could not be said of economic growth.
4.2. Shifting objectives
The 1946 legislation on bank ratios had a perverse effect, however. In the event of a downturn
in the level of bank deposits, commercial banks could resell the public sector debt securities
that they held, which would have posed a problem with regard to public sector finance. A
situation of this kind arose in 1957 and triggered a series of reforms. Their aim was to bring
about a change in State finance conditions based on market forces and to decompartmentalise
the various money and capital markets in order to make interest rates more attractive. Private
individuals were not in fact inclined to deposit their money in the bank due to the excessively
low credit interest rates. This resulted in a marked preference for banknotes and thus a
particularly low monetary multiplier (Figure 4).
After the general recession of 1957, the economic recovery that started in 1958 and 1959
seemed to take effect more slowly in Belgium, as acknowledged by the National Bank itself
(Table 2). Moreover, growth in the 1950s was considered to be inadequate in some quarters.17
This view was not entirely shared by the Bank
34. Be that as it may, these two elements had an
impact on the political and monetary authorities. The government became aware that public
deficits had managed to have a negative influence on monetary policy during the previous
decade, but also came to the conclusion that it needed to play a more active role in stimulating
growth. For its part, the Bank realised that it could not depend solely on money supply
controls to guarantee monetary stability. Its economic role in stimulating or holding back
growth was just as important. To this end, it needed to have effective tools and efficient
financial markets. The reforms introduced in 1957 did indeed represent a decisive factor in
this context. This realisation was thus reflected by a shift in the objective of monetary
stability: a higher rate of inflation was accepted as a necessary part of the equation. It can also
be a reason why the Belgian franc did not follow the Mark and the Guilder revaluations in the
1960s. Nor should we forget that this change in regime was also brought about by the
development of capital movements.
The first results of this shift were a stimulation of the private sector financing, and by
consequence a higher rate of growth of the money supply, particularly of the levels of bank
money (see Table 2), although the level of paper money remained very high compared with
the  other  European  countries  (see  Figure  4).  This  shift  and  the  institutional  reforms
contributed also to break down the slow growth of the 1950s. Belgium recovers during the
1960s higher growth rates compared to other European economies, contrasting with the
situation of the 1950s (Table 3.a.).
Conclusion
The monetary and exchange rate policy is one of the tools for a national or supra-national
entity to transform the external constraint into a growth stimulus. It deserves a particular
attention from the historian or the economist, most probably during a seminal period like the
BW era. Which lesson can be learned from the particular experience of Belgium!? It seems
that the turbulent path of the Belgian monetary policy during the BW period perfecly
illustrates two characteristic difficulties of the monetary policy practice, which are still
remaining nowadays.
First, it raises the question of the role of the monetary and exchange rate policy!: should it
essentially aim at price stability or could it follow other objectives, like economic growth or
financial stability (Papademos 2003, Modigliani 1977)!? Afterwar, the Belgian monetary
authorities strongly chose the first option, this choice guiding the monetary policy practice to
a very orthodox way. However, during the 1960s, the resilience against Keynesian principles
diminished, because these principles asserted themselves in other countries or in other levels
of the economic policy decision. Then a shift in the objective of the monetary policy
occurred!: monetary authorities accepted to contribute actively to the objective of economic
growth. Despite this shift, the growing openness of the economy and the raise of capital
mobility diminished the efficiency of a potential expansionnary monetary policy. This fact
reduced the ability to follow several goals, due to a loss of the monetary policy autonomy.
                                                   
34“In this respect, we should not forget that the Belgian economy’s growth rate in recent years was regarded as
too slow by some parties. These criticisms are based on a certain degree of generalisation and a number of
errors. There are no precise reasons and no absolute criteria on which to base a definitive and objective
diagnosis.” Banque nationale de Belgique, Rapport annuel, 1960, p. 18 (own translation).18
Secondly, the path of the Belgian monetary policy raise the difficulty for the monetary
authorities to adapt themselves to new challenges
35. In this paper, we concentrate our attention
on  the external constraint, characterised by the advent of a new International Monetary
System and the development of capital movements. Facing these challenges, the monetary
authorities chose not to use the whole flexibility of the BW agreements, because they strongly
believed  in  the  advantages of the Gold standard and prefered monetary austerity as a
guarantee of stability. Then we demonstrate how this choice was uncompatible with the slow
introduction of the IMS. Such a strategy certainly allowed the monetary authorities to
complete their objectives of low inflation and strong franc up to the end of the 1950s, but a
slower internal growth dynamic set up in return. Belgian monetary authorities were more
reactive to the development of capital movements. They were encouraged to do so by the
openness of the Belgian economy and by their willingness to promote the principles of the
market economy. However, the introduction of a two-tier exchange market from 1954 did not
prevent a progressive loss of the monetary policy autonomy. The leitmotiv of the Belgian
monetary authorities during the BW period was to innovate in front of new challenges while
staying the guarantor of the monetary stability. This is still today the dilemma for central
banks, even if those challenges have changed.
                                                   
35 Padoa-Schioppa (1994), p. 542.19
Figures
Figure 1. Official foreign exchange market
 Deviation from the official parity of the Belgian franc's exchange rate
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Source!: Banque nationale de Belgique, Statistiques économiques belges.
Note!: the line gives the deviation as a percentage of the official parity. A negative deviation means a
depreciation of the Belgian franc with respect to the official parity.
Figure 2. Spread in the Two-tier foreign exchange market






















Dollar Pound Deutche Mark Discount rate (right hand scale)
Source!: Banque nationale de Belgique, Statistiques économiques belges.
Note!: the lines give the spread as a percentage of the official market’s exchange rate. A negative deviation
means a depreciation of the Belgian franc on the free exchange market. After 1959, exchange rates spread’s lines
are superimposed, as a consequence of arbitrage.20
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Source!: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
Note!: five European partners!: France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy and United Kingdom.
Figure 4. Evolution of the ratio between paper money
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Source!: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
Note!: five European partners!: France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy and United Kingdom.21
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Source!: Mitchell (2003).
Note!: five european partners!: France, Germany, Netherlands, Italy and United Kingdom.
Tables
Table 1. Evolution of the cumulative position of the BLEU
 with respect to the EPU
Net position of BLEU to EPU  (billions of Belgian francs)
total claims
(1) = (2) + (3)
Paid in Gold or
dollar
(2)







1951 28,1 11,5 16,6 41
1952 41,4 24,0 17,4 58
1953 38,9 23,0 15,9 59
1954 37,6 26,5 11,1 70
1955 45,3 33,7 11,6 47
1956 56,2 44,0 12,2 78
1957 52,9 43,6 9,3 82
1958 63,8 53,5 10,3 84
Source!: Cassiers and Ledent (2005) Table 4.3. p. 117.22
Table 2. Evolution of the GNP, prices and money supply
Annual growth rate
GNP (constant






1945 - - 84,6 106,0 92,8 59
1946 - - 4,3 35,0 17,0 52
1947 - - 6,9 1,3 3,9 59
1948 - - 5,6 5,2 5,4 59
1949 - - 2,9 5,4 3,9 58
1950 - - 1,4 -3,0 -0,4 59
1944-1950** - - 123,6 218,1 160,2 59
1950 4,8 -1,2 1,4 -3,3 -0,5 59
1951 5,8 9,0 7,4 10,2 8,5 59
1952 -0,6 3,0 2,9 4,5 3,6 58
1953 4,2 -2,0 3,8 2,6 3,3 59
1954 4,6 -0,4 0,8 3,4 1,8 58
1955 3,1 3,4 3,8 6,4 4,9 58
1956 3,7 1,4 3,2 2,7 3,0 58
1957 2,5 3,5 1,0 -1,8 -0,2 58
1958 -1,8 2,6 4,2 8,1 5,8 57
1949-1958** 2,9 2,1 3,2 3,5 3,3 58
1959 3,7 -0,6 0,8 6,5 3,2 56
1960 4,4 2,0 4,5 -1,5 1,9 58
1961 5,0 1,1 4,3 12,4 7,7 56
1962 5,6 1,2 7,2 7,2 7,2 56
1963 4,4 2,9 8,5 10,0 9,2 55
1964 6,8 4,7 6,5 7,7 7,1 55
1965 3,8 5,1 5,9 8,6 7,1 54
1966 2,9 4,4 3,1 10,9 6,6 53
1967 3,9 3,1 0,8 5,8 3,2 51
1968 4,2 2,7 2,9 12,1 7,4 49
1969 7,1 3,6 -0,1 5,2 2,6 48
1970 6,3 4,8 3,0 13,3 8,3 46
1971 3,8 5,3 7,3 12,5 10,2 44
1958-1971** 4,8 3,1 4,2 8,5 7,4 52
Source!: Cassiers and Ledent (2005), Table 3.4 p. 89, table 4.4 p. 122 and Table 5.2 p. 150
* GNP deflator
** Annual average23
Table 3. Structural data for the Belgian economy and its main trading partners
a. GDP per capita
Annual compound growth rate
1944-1950 1950-1960 1960-1971 1944-1971
Belgium 4,8 2,4 4,3 3,7
Netherlands 14,6 3,3 3,7 5,9
West Germany -6,1 7,1 3,4 2,5
France 13,8 3,6 4,4 6,1
Italy 6,0 5,4 4,7 5,3
United Kingdom -0,5 2,3 2,2 1,6
Total of 5 partners 1,6 4,3 3,6 3,8
Sources: Maddison (1995).
b. Degree of openness (X / (GDP + M))
Percentage
1953 1960 1973
Belgium 24,6 26,1 36,2
Netherlands 35,4 35,6 31,9
West Germany 16,8 20,4 18,4
France 12,7 13,9 14,4
Italy 10,6 14,7 14,6
United Kingdom 18,6 18,7 18,8
Average of 5 partners 18,8 20,7 19,6
Source: Kredietbank (1996)
c. Public finances
Public debt / GNP
Percentage
National surplus (+)
or deficit (-) / GDP
Percentage
1950 1960 1970 1950 1960 1970
Belgium 73,0 69,3 48,0 - -3,8 -1,8
Netherlands - 44,0 28,7 1,6 0,7 -1,1
West Germany 7,4 7,4 7,0 -0,8 -0,6 -0,1
France - 28,4 12,6 -5,7 -1,4 0,5
Italy - 39,9 36,7 - -1,6 -5,1
United Kingdom* - 1,8 1,3 2,5 -1,9 1,4
Average of 5 partners** 24,3 17,3 -0,8 -0,9
Sources : International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics.
*!: internal debt only.
**!: the average is calculated on the basis of available data.24
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